IN RESPONSE: I agree with Dr. Trainor and colleagues that recognizing and managing iron deficiency in patients with CHF is important. Given the limited space allotted for my article, I gave preference to therapies or interventions that are class I recommendations (for example, guideline-directed medical therapy with angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors or ␤-blockers), especially those with a definitive effect on survival. I also included therapies that did not meet this criterion but have long been and still are widely used in the treatment of heart failure (particularly digoxin and diuretics). In addition, I discussed practices that are not definitively associated with survival benefit but are commonly prescribed to the population of patients with heart failure at large (such as lifestyle modifications and exercise therapy) instead of to a subset of patients with heart failure, such as those with iron deficiency.
The 2017 American College of Cardiology, American Heart Association, and Heart Failure Society of America focused update of the American College of Cardiology Foundation and American Heart Association guideline for the management of heart failure assigned management of anemia a class IIb recommendation, stating, "In patients with [New York Heart Association] class II and III [heart failure] and iron deficiency . . . intravenous iron replacement might be reasonable to improve functional status and [quality of life]" (1) . The 2016 European Society of Cardiology guideline referenced by Dr. Trainor and colleagues (2) assigned treatment of iron deficiency a class IIa recommendation, stating, "Intravenous ferric carboxymaltose should be considered in symptomatic patients with [heart failure with reduced ejection fraction] and iron deficiency . . . in order to alleviate [heart failure] symptoms, and improve exercise capacity and quality of life." Given this guideline's softer language in assigning this therapy a class IIa and IIb recommendation and mentioning the associated secondary outcomes of quality of life and functional status (as opposed to survival), I did not discuss iron deficiency and anemia. With more allowable space, iron deficiency certainly would have been a valuable topic to have included in this article. Defining, Estimating, and Communicating Overdiagnosis in Cancer Screening TO THE EDITOR: Davies and colleagues (1) provide a comprehensive list of definitions and concepts related to cancer overdiagnosis, including the terms maldetection and misclassification. To our knowledge, these 2 terms were first used in our 2016 article (2) and associated response (3) and were subsequently cited by Jenniskens and associates (4). We defined misclassification overdiagnosis as overdiagnosis due to lowering diagnostic thresholds of physiologic variables that occur on a spectrum. As such, many persons are diagnosed with a disease despite the absence of current or future symptoms. Our example was chronic kidney disease. This term also captures the phenomenon of lowering diagnostic thresholds on a symptom scale such that persons without a harmful condition are nevertheless diagnosed with that condition, as happens in some cases of attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder. We defined maldetection overdiagnosis as overdiagnosis that occurs when a true-positive result cannot distinguish between patients with a harmful disease and those with a disease that is not harmful and used thyroid cancer as an example.
Given the close similarities between Davies and colleagues' definitions and examples of these terms and our own, we are surprised that they claim that maldetection and misclassification are separate from overdiagnosis and define these terms as mechanisms or factors leading to overdiagnosis rather than types of overdiagnosis. A key aim of our typology is to link subtypes of overdiagnosis with their causal mechanisms, which we believe are lack of clarity about the boundaries of disease in misclassification overdiagnosis and lack of discriminatory power in our current gold standard diagnostic tests in maldetection overdiagnosis. One of us (W.A.R.) has built on this typology in proposing philosophically defensible ways of defining disease to respond to the problem of overdiagnosis (5) .
One of the most important insights of our typology is that any patient who is overdiagnosed is either maldetected or misclassified (or, rarely, both). As such, many phenomena that are termed "overdiagnosis" can be traced to these subtypes, the identification of which can help to determine causes and guide responses. Our taxonomy distinguishes these subtypes by how they arise, but they are both types of overdiagnosis. 
IN RESPONSE:
We thank Drs. Rogers and Mintzker for noting that they were the first to propose the terms maldetection and misclassification as categories of overdiagnosis. We regret that in our writing process their place as the originators of the usage was lost.
They were surprised that we categorized maldetection and misclassification as mechanisms that can lead to overdiagnosis rather than types of overdiagnosis. We stand by this decision and believe that the difference is subtle but important. Our article is about definitional issues related to overdiagnosis specific to cancer screening; therefore, we believed that choosing a narrow focus was important. By examining the steps and mechanisms that can lead to overdiagnosis in cancer screening, we are better able to understand and explain how it could be measured and how it may best be communicated. In addition, overdiagnosis in cancer screening can occur through different mechanisms not captured by maldetection or misclassification. Because maldetection and misclassification are neither mutually exclusive nor comprehensive in describing types of overdiagnosed cancer, we prefer to use these terms to understand mechanisms that can lead to overdiagnosis rather than as types of overdiagnosis. For example, life expectancy plays a role in determining the likelihood of overdiagnosis. A case of stage I lung cancer detected on low-dose computed tomography at age 90 years is more likely to be overdiagnosed than one detected at age 70 years.
Despite these differences in definitions and usages, we believe that our article builds on the important work of Drs. Rogers and Mintzker. Rather than identifying 1 model as right or wrong, considering the purpose of the model may be more useful. The purpose of our model is to understand and calculate overdiagnosis in the context of cancer screening; that of Drs. Rogers and Mintzker, as stated in their publications, is to think about broad issues of overdiagnosis and its mitigation.
We welcome the continuing philosophical discussion about what constitutes overdiagnosis and how to more broadly address it in health care and hope that our definition will provide clarity in the realm of research, policy, and communication related to cancer screening. Firearms and Dementia TO THE EDITOR: I was disappointed that Betz and colleagues (1) did not clarify the actual size of the problem of suicide by firearm in patients with dementia. The authors provide only a theoretical context in stating that the number of patients with dementia is increasing, some of these patients will commit suicide by firearm, and many households have firearms. In 2011, Seyfried and associates (2) described a retrospective analysis of data from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs between 2001 and 2005 on 294 952 patients with dementia, 97.2% of whom were male. They found that 241 patients committed suicide, 72.6% by firearm. This translated to an estimated 11.9 suicides by firearm per 100 000 persons with dementia per year. They identified potential predictors of suicide, including male sex, white race, depression, a history of an inpatient psychiatric stay, and prescriptions for antidepressants or antianxiety medications. Seyfried and associates also indicated that persons were much more likely to commit suicide early in their diagnosis of dementia.
Louise Davies, MD, MS
Although suicide by firearm is not common in persons with dementia, it does occur, and the rate of suicide in these persons is probably similar to that in other patients who are diagnosed with a terminal or serious condition. Betz and colleagues' general recommendations seem sound, but their
IN RESPONSE:
We agree with Dr. Ertle that dementia is not the only condition that increases the risk for suicide. This risk is related to many static and transient factors, including physical and mental health conditions and social stressors. In all of these cases, access to firearms can increase the acute risk for death because firearms are a highly lethal method of suicide. In other publications, we and many other authors have discussed the prevention of suicide by firearm in populations besides persons with dementia. In this commentary, we sought instead to explore the various risks for injury by firearm that might be associated with dementia. Dr. Ertle is correct that epidemiologic data are lacking, and we strongly support increasing funding for research and injury surveillance systems. Meanwhile, clinicians and families face decisions about firearm access on a daily basis and deserve guidance and resources.
Marian E. Betz, MD, MPH
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